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One way to improve the liquidity of small stocks is to subsidize the providers of liquidity. These 
subsidies take many forms such as informational advantages, priority in trading with incoming order 
flow, and fee rebates for limit order traders. In this study, we examine another type of subsidy – 
directly paying liquidity providers to provide contractual improvement in liquidity.  Our specific focus 
here is the 2002 decision by the Stockholm Stock Exchange to allow listed firms to negotiate with 
liquidity providers to set maximum spread widths and minimum depths. We find, for a sample of stocks 
that entered into such an arrangement, a significant improvement in market quality with a decline in 
quoted spreads and an increase in quoted depth throughout the limit order book. We also find 
evidence that suggests that there are improvements beyond those contracted for. In addition, both 
inter and intraday volatility decline following the entry of committed liquidity providers for these stocks. 
Traders benefit by the reduced costs as well as by the ease of finding liquidity as seen in the 
increased trade sizes. We also find that a firm’s stock price subsequent to entering into the agreement 
rises in direct proportion to the improvement in market quality Thus, we find overwhelming evidence of 
liquidity benefits to listed firms of entering into such contracts which suggests that firms should 
consider these market quality improvement opportunities as they do other capital budgeting decisions 
and that there are residual benefits beyond those contracted for..  Paying for Market Quality 
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How to improve the liquidity for stocks has been the focus of regulators, exchanges, and 
academics around the world. Exchanges have reduced tick sizes and enacted concentration 
rules. Regulators have insured that public orders have equal standing with dealer quotes. In 
addition to market wide measures exchanges have allowed for subsidies to be paid to suppliers 
of liquidity. For example, NYSE specialists have historically been given an information 
advantage over other traders in return for creating a market for a stock. The Toronto Stock 
Exchange allows registered traders to have priority over other traders at the same price. Finally, 
ECNs and markets give fee rebates to liquidity suppliers.  
In addition to these indirect subsidies to liquidity suppliers, recently some exchanges are 
allowing listed firms to directly subsidize firms that will provide a negotiated contractual level of 
liquidity in return for a negotiated fee. Given that a firm’s cost of capital is directly related to the 
cost to trade its stock maximization of shareholder wealth then dictates that managers seek to 
minimize trading costs.
 1 Such an arrangement allows managers to weigh the costs and benefits 
of improved market quality and decide on the optimal level of liquidity they desire for the firm’s 
stock. The contractual nature of the relationship makes the liquidity provider directly 
accountable to the listing firm. The study of such arrangements is the focus of our study. We 
investigate the impact of these contracts on market quality, the relationship between the amount 
paid and the improvement received, whether there are additional benefits beyond that which are 
negotiated, and whether the managers make positive net present value decisions by paying for 
market quality.  
The issue of paying liquidity providers to guarantee a minimum level of liquidity in the 
firm’s stock is directly related to the market structure adopted by different markets. In a multiple 
market-maker system, it is common for market makers to choose whether they will make a 
market in a stock. Examples of market maker driven markets are Nasdaq, SEAQ, Nouveau 
                                            
1 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) among others. Paying for Market Quality 
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Marché, and Neuer Markt.
2 Some other markets assign a market maker with affirmative 
obligations, a specialist, to a company’s stock, but typically firms cannot negotiate the services 
and fees paid to specialists. Examples of specialist markets are the NYSE, Toronto Stock 
Exchange, and Italy’s Nouvou Mercato. Markets may also choose to set maximum limits on 
certain market quality measures. For example the Toronto Stock Exchange has “target” spread 
widths and Nouvou Mercato limits spreads to 5%. However, the fact that intermediaries do not 
naturally arise in the market to provide this level of liquidity (as in Domowitz and Steil (2002)) 
indicates that such affirmative obligations are costly and exchanges need to devise systems to 
compensate the designated liquidity providers. On the NYSE, such compensation comes in the 
form of certain privileges for the specialist that are not available to other traders combined with 
allowing these specialists to trade on privileged information.
3 Even with this advantage studies 
find that specialists on the NYSE use the profits from trading in liquid stocks to subsidize losses 
incurred in trading illiquid ones (Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997.)  
While this system works well on the NYSE’s floor based system (not without its share of 
critics), electronic markets have struggled to find an alternative mechanism.
4 Without such 
compensation, market intermediaries may ignore the illiquid securities that have limited potential 
for profit. Unfortunately, these are the securities that most need and benefit from the presence 
of liquidity providers (Grossman and Miller (1988) provide the theoretical basis for this result 
while Neal (1992) empirically verifies their hypothesis). Recently, exchanges in Europe have 
                                            
2 Nouveau Marché and Neuer Markt employ periodic call auctions in addition to market makers. Nouveau 
Marché bases the frequency of call auctions on the number of market makers making a market in a stock. 
Neuer Markt directs all small trades into a call market, while large trades are traded continuously through 
market makers. 
3 On the NYSE, specialists are the only traders with complete knowledge of the book. Even the adoption 
of Open Book by the NYSE did not eliminate this informational advantage. Open Book allows interested 
parties to pay to see price and depth away from the inside, however stop orders, stop-limit orders, and 
the hidden portion of orders is not seen. 
4 A TSX discussion paper on ”Market Making Reform,” (August 2002)  brings up this issue in, ”Market 
making models in other jurisdictions, including the NYSE specialist model and the NASDAQ dealer model 
provide market makers with certain informational advantages and greater control of order flow, which 
contribute to the magnitude of capital provided for market making activities. TSX is seeking input 
concerning possible changes to the market making model to facilitate capital increases for market making Paying for Market Quality 
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adopted a system whereby the listing firm contracts with a liquidity provider to maintain a market 
presence and guarantee an agreed upon minimum level of market quality. The firm directly 
compensates the liquidity provider for these services.
5 These designated liquidity providers then 
function much like “passive” specialists in that they have affirmative obligations to fulfil without 
any informational advantages. In this respect, they resemble most closely the specialists 
envisioned by Glosten (1989) who are still able to improve market quality for stocks with high 
risk of adverse selection due to their longer trading horizon.  
Our study has direct relevance for the literature on market structure. While Glosten 
(1994) contends that an electronic limit order book dominates other market structures, Parlour 
and Seppi (2003) show that hybrid structures can add to the liquidity of the market. We study 
one such hybrid structure where the listing firms are allowed to choose the level of liquidity they 
desire. Empirically, the value of a specialist has been studied by a number of authors. 
Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), and Madhavan and 
Panchapegesan (2000) study various issues related to the performance of NYSE specialists. 
Neal (1992), Mayhew (2002) and Anand and Weaver (2005) examine the value of a specialist in 
the options market. A number of other studies compare execution costs and depth on market 
maker and specialist (NYSE) systems (for example Grossman and Miller (1988), Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997), and Bessembinder(1999)).  
Two recent papers are closely related to our study. Nimalendran and Petrella (2002) find 
an improvement in market quality on the Italian Stock Exchange after specialists were 
introduced for thinly traded stocks. However, they limit their study to the NYSE framework which 
is not directly applicable to this paper, as the “specialist” in our study differs in very fundamental 
ways from the NYSE specialist. Nimalendran and Petrella (2002) also do not analyze the effect 
of specialist introduction on the cost of capital for the firms entering into a market-making 
                                                                                                                                             
activities in the interest of enhancing liquidity and the effectiveness of central price discovery.” 
5 Panayides and Charitou (2004) provide a detailed discussion of the different versions of this system Paying for Market Quality 
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arrangement for their stock. In the second paper, Venkataraman, and Waisburd (2005) examine 
the impact of firms on the Paris Bourse employing a liquidity provider. Venkataraman, and 
Waisburd (2005) focus on the benefits of a designated market-maker to stocks traded in a call 
auction environment on the Paris Bourse. They find support for the Glosten (1994) hypothesis 
that a designated market-maker may prevent market failure. They also find that this decreased 
probability of market failure is associated with a statistically significant positive return around the 
adoption of a liquidity provider, which supports the link between trading costs and required 
returns.  
Our study extends the existing literature in the following ways. First, we examine the role 
of a liquidity provider in a continuous not a call.  Therefore, our focus is not on market failure but 
on the impact of market-maker adoption on conventional measures of market quality such as 
spreads, depth and volatility. We also link changes in these measures to changes in the cost of 
capital of the firm. Second, we explicitly analyze the terms of the contracts between firms and 
the market-makers responsible for providing liquidity. That is, while in previous studies, firms 
faced a binary choice of either contracting with a liquidity provider or not, n our sample, listing 
firms can choose how much liquidity they want for their stocks. Thus, every firm chooses its 
optimum level of liquidity, trading off the improvements in liquidity with the contractual payments 
to the liquidity providers. We can thus study the economic rationale of these arrangements as 
well as the interaction between contractual minimum market quality standards and the 
payments required for meeting those standards. 
We conduct the above-mentioned analyses in the specific context of the 2002 decision 
by the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) to allow listed firms to contract with liquidity providers. 
This decision was aimed at enhancing liquidity in small and mid-cap stocks and in particular to 
establish a two-sided market for these stocks throughout the trading day. Like the Paris Bourse, 
the SSE sets maximum spread widths and minimum depths for all firms choosing to contract 
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with a liquidity provider. Also similar to the Paris Bourse, firms may contract for better terms 
than the exchange minimums. Unlike the Paris Bourse, all firms on the SSE trade in a 
continuous market with an opening and closing call auction. This allows us to examine typical 
market quality measures such as spread and depth for our entire sample, thus allowing us to 
draw inferences that may be applied to other continuous auction markets such as the NYSE.  
We find that firms reap quantifiable benefits of their decision to contract with liquidity 
providers for market quality. Specifically, quoted dollar and percentage spreads experience a 
decline, which is economically as well as statistically significant. We find strong evidence that 
the contractual liquidity attracts significant additional liquidity. Quoted depth increases at the 
inside quotes as well as at other price points in the book (up to four price levels away from the 
inside market). This improvement in market quality is robust to changes in market conditions 
conventionally known to impact transactions costs. The increased depth is better able to absorb 
liquidity shocks hence resulting in lower return volatility. We also find some evidence that 
traders take advantage of the improved depth by submitting larger order sizes as seen by an 
increase in trade sizes. Lower costs of trading also result in higher trading volume for the 
concerned stocks. We also analyze the link between transaction costs and returns and find that 
prices increase following the contracting for market making services. Consistent with 
Venkataraman and Waisburd (2004), we find cumulative abnormal returns to be statistically 
significant. We also find that the abnormal returns are directly related to the improvement in 
transaction costs.  
We examine LP firm trading profits and find no evidence that they obtain compensation 
other than the contract fees. Finally, we examine the relationship between contract costs and 
such factors as the contracted improvement in market quality, firm specific characteristics (such 
as volatility and price), and existing relationships with LP firms. Results of a regression analysis 
suggest that all three groups of factors are priced in the contracts. Our findings suggest that the 
decision to contract for market making services (either directly or by listing on an exchange that Paying for Market Quality 
6 
provides these services)  can increase firm value and hence should be treated as any other 
project a firm may consider. 
In the next section we briefly discuss the relevant institutional details of the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange. Section 2 describes the data used in this study. This is followed by our results, 
and the conclusion.  
 
 
1. Institutional Details  
 
The Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) is owned by OM Technology, a firm that supplies 
the trading platform for 27 exchanges around the world. The SSE uses an electronic limit order 
book trading system called SAXESS. All trades entering the limit order book are executed 
against limit orders. Trades can also be executed upstairs and crossed on the system. Over 
80% of all trades occur against the book.  
During the period of our study, all stocks trade continuously from 9:30 AM to 5:20 PM.
6 
There is also an opening and closing call auction for all stocks. Like other exchanges that 
represent the only market in their country, the SSE has several “sections” for stocks with 
differing liquidity levels. Until recently, there was no official market making in stocks. Therefore 
inside quotes were determined by public limit orders. This led to occasional situations of wide 
spreads, one-side markets, or no quotes whatsoever. Obviously, these problems were a 
function of trading interest in the stock. To remedy this situation for less liquid stocks, the SSE, 
in 2002, allowed firms to contract with liquidity providers to make markets in their stocks. The 
exchange sets maximum spread widths and minimum depths, but firms are free to negotiate 
narrower spreads or larger depths. The SSE monitors the performance of the liquidity providers 
based on the contract between the firm and the liquidity provider.  
 
                                            
6 The opening time has been changed to 9:00 AM after our study period ended. Paying for Market Quality 
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2. Data  
 
We obtain from the SSE, the list of firms that contracted liquidity providers between 
September 2002 and March of 2004. These 50 firms, along with the date on which the LP 
started making a market in the stock are listed in Table 1. The date the LP began making a 
market in a firm’s stock is later than the contract date. The SSE determined the actual date that 
each liquidity provider began making a market for each stock and provided us with that list. 
Liquidity providers begin making markets for firms in our sample on 38 different dates over a 21 
month period. The dispersion of dates greatly reduces the probability that any observed 
changes are due to market wide factors. Therefore, we do not construct a control sample of 
firms that did not adopt liquidity providers.  
The SSE provided us with data for a period surrounding the LP effective date for each 
firm. We use data for the 20 trading days before and after the adoption of an LP for each firm. 
The adoption date is not included in either sample. We use two types of data in this study. The 
first is a data set that contains snapshots of the first five price levels of each firm’s limit order 
book at 15 minute intervals throughout the day. The data contain the price and size at five price 
levels on each side of the book. The SSE employs an opening and closing call auction for all 
stocks. We only include data during the continuous trading portion of the market from 9:30 AM 
to 5:20 PM.  
We also use trade records for our stocks. Similar to the TAQ database, each trade 
record contains the time stamp of each trade along with the price and volume. Unlike TAQ, each 
record also contains the identities of the buyer and seller as well as whether the trade occurred 
outside the quoted inside spread. Knowing the identities of the parties involved in each trade 
allows us to directly observe the contribution of liquidity providers, allowing us to make finer 
observations as to the potential benefit of LPs. The data also contain an indicator as to whether 
each trade is buyer or seller initiated. Paying for Market Quality 
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Finally, we obtain from the SSE copies of the contracts that each firm entered into with 
their liquidity provider firm.  Firms are not required to reveal the terms of the contract, but a large 
number do. All but one of the contracts contains the maximum spread width that the LP firm will 
provide. The amounts are listed in the last column of Table 1 next to the average percentage 
spread for each firm for the 20 trading days prior to the start of a LP. Comparing these two 
columns reveals that some firms will experience a very large reduction in spread while others 
will not. In particular, MSC Konsult has an average percentage spread of over 16% in the 20 
days preceding contracting with an LP, while Bejer AB has a pre spread of 2.5% and a contract 
spread of 4%.  This suggests that some firms may be concerned with an overall reduction in 




3. Results  
3.1 Overall Market Quality  
At the heart of the liquidity provider contract is an agreement between the LP and the 
firm to narrow their spread and increase depth. We therefore begin our analysis by examining 
these two measures. The quote data that we use for this study is based on snapshots of the 
limit order book every fifteen minutes throughout the day. Thus, we calculate the simple average 
spread for each stock and then average over all 50 stocks in our sample. We calculate quoted 
spread in Swedish kroner (SEK) as well as a percentage based on the midpoint of the spread. 
The contracts specify the spread limit based on the asked price. As mentioned earlier, 
companies are free to enter contracts that provide better terms than the exchange set 
maximum. Table 2 contains the results for quoted spread. We find that the average spread 
width dropped from SEK 1.67 to SEK 0.78 a statistically significant drop of SEK 0.89. Examining 
percentage spreads we find that they dropped on average from 4.47% to 2.06%. Percentage 
spreads dropped by over half, to a level that’s over one full percentage point below the Paying for Market Quality 
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exchange set maximum. The results for spread-width following the adoption of a liquidity 
provider mirror the results other authors have found for firms switching from NASDAQ to the 
NYSE.  
To obtain a complete picture of the distribution of percentage spreads in each period, in 
addition to the period averages we also examine the dispersion of percentage spreads. In 
particular we measure the percentage of spread observations in each period that are wider or 
narrower than the contractual percentage spread. We would expect that the percentage of 
observations of spread that are wider than the contractual maximum would reduce in the post 
period. Examining Table 2 reveals that this is indeed the case. On average the percentage of 
observed spreads in the pre period that are wider than the maximum that will be established in 
the post period is nearly 50%. In contrast this measure reduces by a statistically significant 
amount to about 8% in the post period. 
Examining the percentage of observations where percentage spread is narrower than 
the contractual maximum not only gives insight to the dispersion of observed spreads, it also 
allows us to examine whether the public added to the liquidity of the markets after the 
introduction of an LP. The LP firms agree to maintain a maximum spread and the results just 
mentioned suggest they do that. However, there is no incentive for the LP firms to narrow the 
spread any further. Therefore, reductions in spread beyond that set down in the contract can be 
attributed to additional public orders.
7 This is consistent with the widely held belief that “liquidity 
begets liquidity.” If the public is adding additional liquidity then we would expect the percentage 
of time that spreads are narrower to reduce significantly in the post period. Examining the 
percentage of time that spreads are narrower we find that indeed in the post period percentage 
spreads are narrower than the contractual maximum over 90% of the time. Part of this large 
number of observations less that the maximum may be a function of how we measure 
percentage spread. That is, a percentage spread of 1.999% is indeed less than 2% but not Paying for Market Quality 
10 
economically so. Therefore, we calculate the percentage of observations in the post period 
where the observed spread is narrower than Contract-X, where contract is the percentage 
contractual spread and X is a number less than Contract. We are therefore measuring spreads 
that are significantly narrower. We find that when X=0.005 that 70% of the observed spreads in 
the post are less than Contract-X. When we increase X to 0.01 (i.e. observed spreads are 100 
b.p. less than contractual amounts) we find that the percentage reduces to a still large 51%. 
Since they have no obvious incentive to do so, it is hard to imagine that LP firms would 
reduce spreads significantly beyond what is required. Therefore, we view large percentage of 
spreads that are significantly less than the contractual amount as strong evidence that the 
introduction of LP firms brings other benefits not detailed in the LP contract. This suggests that 
contracting with an LP firm is value adding. We will explore this issue further later in the paper, 
but for now we turn to the measurement of other measures of market quality. 
Accordingly, we next examine quoted depth. We measure depth in both the number of 
shares and in currency units. The number of shares on the bid and ask sides are summed to 
yield total depth. Because a 500 share increase in depth is a small increase for a listed firm with 
a normal depth of 10,000 shares, but a large increase for a normal depth of 1,000 shares we 
examine absolute as well as relative (percentage) depth changes for each firm. Examining 
Table 2 for inside depth reveals a statistically significant relative increase of over 35% following 
the introduction of liquidity providers. This suggests that the presence of a liquidity provider in 
the market is associated with a higher depth for the stock. We also examine the amount of 
depth away from the inside. Recall that our data contain depth on each side of the market for 
the inside as well as four additional levels away from the inside. We sum the depth offered and 
sought for the four price levels away from the inside and calculate the change after the adoption 
of liquidity providers. Table 2 lists the results. We find that similar to inside depth, aggregate 
depth away from the inside increased significantly, on a relative basis, following the contracting 
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of liquidity providers.  
The observed increase in depth found for our sample should act to absorb market 
shocks leading to lower volatility. Accordingly, we next examine changes in volatility for our 
sample. We define volatility as the standard deviation of 15 minute returns based on quote 
midpoints.
8 . We will show later that for less than 1% of the possible 15 minute time slots in our 
study there is not a two-sided quoted spread. In these instances the return would be for a period 
exceeding 15 minutes. To mitigate the effects of these data points (and because there are so 
few of them), we only include those periods that have an opening and closing two-sided spread 
for a 15 minute period. Examining the change in volatility given in Table 2, reveals that intra-day 
volatility dropped from 7.88% to 5.76%, a statistically significant decline. This is consistent with 
our hypothesis that the observed increase in depth reduces the impact of price shocks.  
A number of studies have shown that spread width is inversely related to trading activity. 
Therefore, we expect measures of trading activity to increase following the beginning of market 
making activities by liquidity providers. Accordingly, we calculate several measures of trading 
activity and report the results in Table 2. We find that the average daily number of trades 
increases from 9.18 to 14.82 and that the increase is statistically significant. Although the 
average daily number of trades is only 9.18 in the period prior to market making activities, it 
must be remembered that the firms in our sample contract with liquidity providers specifically 
because they are small firms with low interest among investors – a fact that is faced by many 
firms around the world.  
We find that average daily trading volume, measured in both number of shares and 
Swedish kroner, exhibits statistically significant relative increases. However, there is wide 
dispersion among the individual firm volume results, suggesting that medians are a more 
appropriate measure than averages. We find that the median daily share volume increases from 
7,452 in the pre period to 9,364 in the post period. Therefore, we conclude that outliers are not Paying for Market Quality 
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driving our results.  
Combining together the daily volume in the post period with the reduction in percentage 
spread illustrates the large savings in transaction costs enjoyed by investors after firms adopt a 
LP. We find that based on a 250 day trading year, the annual cost savings to investors for these 
50 firms is in excess of SEK74,762,149 (US$10,680,311.)
9 These cost savings are non-trivial. 
This increase in trading volume is accompanied by an increase in average trade size. Larger 
quoted depth should allow traders who trade in size to increase their trade size rather than 
breaking up larger orders. We therefore estimate the change in trade size for each firm and 
report the average result in Table 2. Consistent with our conjecture, the average trade size 
increases significantly from 3,072 to 4,884 shares.
10  
The next market quality measure reported in Table 2 is the percentage of time that a 
firm’s stock has a two sided quoted spread and defined as the percentage of 15 minute 
snapshots (during continuous trading) that have both a bid and an ask. We find that on average, 
the percentage of time with a two sided quote increased insignificantly from 99.6% to 99.8%.  
We next test whether the improved market quality we find is due to factors other than the 
introduction of liquidity providers. For example Stoll (1985) shows that relative spread is 
inversely related to price and trading activity, and directly related to volatility. Therefore, we 
perform regressions of the form 
t i, 4 t i, 3 t i, 2 t i, 1 0 t i, Dummy β σ β Volume β Price β β S + + + + =  
to control for confounding factors, where:  t i, S  is the mean spread (quoted or effective) for firm i 
                                                                                                                                             
8 Quote midpoints are used to mitigate the problem of bid-ask bounce. 
9 We multiple the average percentage effective spread reduction against the average daily Swedish 
Kroner (SEK) volume in the post period to get a daily SEK cost savings. We then multiple by 250 trading 
days then by the number of sample firm. We convert to US$ by assuming an exchange rate of 7 SEK to 1 
US$.  
10 Multiplying the average daily number of trades by the avergae trade size will not equal the average 
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in period t (pre or post);  t i, Price  is the mean closing price for firm i during period t:  t i, Volume  
the mean daily share volume for firm i during period t;  σi.t, is the standard deviation of intra-day 
return for firm i during period t; Dummyi.t  is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the 
period is post, otherwise zero. If the observed decrease in quoted spreads can be attributed to 
the introduction of liquidity providers, we would expect the parameter estimate for Dummy to be 
negative and significant.  
The results are reported in Table 3. We find that the parameter estimate for the Dummy 
variable is of the expected negative sign and statistically significant at acceptable levels for both 
quoted kroner and percentage spreads. This suggests that our findings are not due to 
confounding factors but instead are associated with the introduction of liquidity providers for 
firms in our sample.  
 
3.3 Impact of Spread Reduction on Returns 
A number of authors have shown that liquidity and stock prices are related.
11 Recall that 
we show previously that there are additional liquidity benefits to firms beyond those specified in 
the LP contract. This in turn, suggests that prices should increase following the adoption of 
liquidity providers by firms. However, in our particular context, the contractual improvement in 
liquidity comes at a cost to the firms. Thus, it is possible that liquidity providers negotiate a fee 
equivalent to the benefit to the firm making it a zero net present value decision. It is then an 
empirical question whether these investments enhance the value of the firm.  
To examine the impact a liquidity provider on firm value, we conduct an event study 
using the date the LP begins providing market making services as the event date.
12  As is now 
                                            
11 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud (2002), Jones 
(2002), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
12 For most firms the date LP services began coincides with the announcement date but for a 
few firms the announcement date is a significant number of days before. For a few firms the 
official announcement came after the liquidity provider began his services. Therefore we use the Paying for Market Quality 
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standard in event studies we estimate abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs.) The event window is 5 days before to 10 days after the introduction of a liquidity 
provider. We calculate daily abnormal returns using the market model with the return on the 
OMX benchmark index employed as a proxy for the market return. Parameters are estimated, 
using daily data, over the period 1-125 to t-6, where t is the date LP services began.  The 
Scholes and Williams (1977) betas are estimated to remove biases arising from infrequent 
trading. Table 4 has the results for the abnormal return on each day in the event window as well 
as the cumulative abnormal return. 
Examining Table 4 reveals that the average return on the day LPs begin making markets 
in a firm’s stock is a positive 1.08%. All but one abnormal daily return is positive on the days 
following the LP start date. The CAR for day t+10 is a statistically significant 6.19%. We note 
that our tests of significance are one-sided in that they test the null hypothesis that the CARs 
are not greater than zero, against the alternative hypothesis that these CARs equal zero. The 
tests are consistent with our hypothesis development. Our results provide strong support for the 
notion that the market reacted positively to the start of market making services and firm values 
increased as a result. 
To examine whether this apparent increase in firm value is related to the reduction in 
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where,  CARi is the cumulative abnormal return on day t and the independent variable is the 
relative change in percentage quoted spread from the pre to post period.  Extant literature 
predicts that the parameter estimate of θ1(t) is negative, indicating that reductions in spread 
have a positive effect on the stock price. Examining the column labelled Change in Spread 
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reveals that indeed there is an apparent relationship between the reduction spread and the 
increase in firm value, consistent with existing literature.  
 
3.3 Liquidity Provider Contribution and Profits 
We next examine the direct contribution of liquidity providers to the observed 
improvement in market quality. Our data do not allow us to identify the source of quotes in the 
limit order book. However, we can identify liquidity providers on trade data, so we concentrate 
our analysis on the contributions liquidity providers make to trading activity. We find that 36 LP 
firms traded the listed firm’s stock prior to contracting to be their LP, while 14 others do not trade 
the listed company’s stock before they enter the contract. The fact that 14 LP firms are induced 
to trade the firm’s stock through contracting alone attests to the improved market quality 
provided by liquidity providers. We conduct additional analysis to examine the extent of 
involvement in the trading process of each listed firm’s LP. The results for trading activity by 
liquidity providers are contained in Table 5.  
Panel A examines the trading activity of liquidity providers after contracting for the 14 
firms that had no previous activity. Examining Panel A reveals that liquidity providers added just 
over 9,000 shares to the average daily volume for these 14 firms. This represents an average of 
15.42 trades a day for an average trade size of 1,612 shares. The number of trades per day and 
the average daily kroner volume are statistically significant at acceptable levels. Turning to 
Panel B, we find that on average liquidity providers increase their contribution to share volume 
to a lesser degree than that found for firms in Panel A. In particular, liquidity providers add 7,741 
shares to the average daily volume observed in the post period for these 36 firms. The change 
in the daily number of trades for firm’s with liquidity provider activity both pre and post is a 
statistically significant 6.31. The average trade size involving liquidity providers is reduced by 
half following the start of market making activities. Coupled with the increase in the number of 
trades involving the liquidity provider, suggests that they are most beneficial to small traders.  Paying for Market Quality 
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Unlike NYSE specialists, SSE LPs have no informational advantage over other market 
participants.
13 Since they have no informational advantage, we would not expect them to earn 
excess profits from trading the stock. In other words, we would expect their compensation to 
arise from what they are paid contractually. To test this hypothesis we estimate the incremental 
trading profits that LP firms earn in the period following the agreement start date. Our data 
identify both the buying and selling firm in each trade and whether the trade was buyer or seller 
initiated. Since we know which firm is the LP for each stock we are able to extract and sign 
trades involving the LP firm.
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where, for stock i and transaction t, xit is the LP firm signed volume for trade t, pit is the price, Iit 
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.  Initial inventory 
Ii0 is not observed, and consistent with Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1999), we set this value 
to zero. The first measure only includes the summation on the right hand side of the equation 
while the second includes the change in inventory. Only those trades involving the LP firm are 
included.  
The results with and without inventory are contained in the last two rows of Panels A and 
B of Table 5. Examining the averages not including inventory reveals that LP firms earn trading 
profits in the days following the start of their services. However there is a large variation in the 
profits which leads to them being statistically insignificant. This is consistent with our hypothesis 
                                            
13 Even though anyone can pay to see the NYSE book (is it a continuous view if you pay for it), only the 
specialist knows the full amount of liquidity since stop orders and CAP orders, representing nonpublic 
supply and demand, are not part of the quotes. The specialist also has the best view of the liquidity 
available on the floor of the exchange that is not reflected in the book. 
14 We do not have identifiers to let us know whether the LP firm is acting as principal or agent. However, if 
agency trades are uninformed  we would expect the trading profits from them to be zero. Thus including Paying for Market Quality 
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that LP firms earn no excess trading profits following the institution of market making services. 
Examining the last row of each panel shows that including ending inventory turns the previously 
observed profit into an insignificant loss.  
Taken together, the findings in this section suggest that some firms may benefit more 
from contracting with a liquidity provider. This in turn suggests that firms may pay differential 
amounts for liquidity provision and that the amount may be related to the amount of market 
quality improvement desired. We will examine this aspect next. 
 
3.4 Contract Terms 
 
As mentioned earlier a large number of firms in our sample reported the terms of their 
contracts to the SSE and they in turn provide them to us. We find that 23 firms reveal not only 
the maximum spread width and minimum depth each LP firm agreed to provide, but also the 
negotiated cost of each contract. The 23 firms in this sub-sample are distributed among three 
different LP firms. We find variation in contract terms, not only between LP firms but also among 
firms using the same LP firm. 
Panel A of Table 6 displays the frequency of contract terms (spread and depth) for the 
23 firms.  We see that the distribution of maximum spread widths is fairly even 2, 2.5, 3, and 
4%. Of the 23 firms in our sample, 20 explicitly state the minimum depth the LP firm guarantees 
for the listed firm.
15 We find that eight of the firms agreed to have the LP provide minimum depth 
of between 1,600 and 2,000 shares while five choose a depth level between 4,000 and 10,000 
shares. The remainder chose amounts as little as 800 shares to as much as 40,000 shares. 
We next examine the remuneration listed firms agree to pay LP firms for their services 
(Panel B). By examining the contracts we find that 19 of the 23 firms have both a fixed and 
variable cost component. Both costs are collected on a monthly basis. Examining the Fixed 
                                                                                                                                             
agency trades in our anaylsis will not assign any bias to our measure. 
15 For most firms minimum depth is expressed in round lots. To convert to share depth we multiple the 
minimum number of round lots times the size of a round lot for that firm at the time the LP starts providing Paying for Market Quality 
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Monthly Cost row of Panel B, Table 6 reveals that the average cost for this portion of the 
contract is 16,000 SEK (about US$2,300) per month. This number seems like a bargain when 
we consider that overall traders in firms with an LP experience a reduction of almost SEK1.5 
million a year in transaction costs. There is variation in the contract amounts, though. The 
maximum fixed portion is 5 times greater than the minimum, suggesting either variation in firm 
characteristics or differences in negotiating power among firms. We will examine this issue later 
in the paper. 
We next turn to the variable cost portion which is a fee that the firm pays LP firms for 
each trade in which they provide liquidity. The costs are calculated on a per share or per trade 
basis. In all cases there is a cap agreed to on the variable portion of the contract. Like fixed 
costs, there is dispersion among the variable costs, with the minimum being 5,000 SEK and the 
maximum being three times larger. The total costs row sums together the fixed and variable 
portion of each contract. We find that there is a similar amount of variation amount total costs. 
We next perform a cost benefit analysis for each firm and aggregate the results across 
firms. To do this analysis we first estimate the average daily cost saving for each firm by 
multiplying its reduction in percentage spread against its average daily Swedish krone volume in 
the post period. The results are contained in the first row of Panel C. We observe that on 
average investors in these 23 firms save over 11,000 krone a day in transaction costs. Not 
everyone seems to have benefited equally since the minimum cost savings is only 88 krone 
while the maximum is over 100,000 krone. 
We assume a 20 trading day month and multiply the average daily savings by 20 to get 
a monthly savings number. From this number we then subtract the total monthly contract cost 
for the firm. We report the numbers in Swedish krone (US dollars) in the second (third) row of 
Panel C. We see that the average monthly benefit to investors in excess of contract cost is 
almost $30,000. However we find that this number is negative for 6 of the 23 firms, suggesting 
                                                                                                                                             
liquidity.  Paying for Market Quality 
19 
that not all firms should have contracted with a LP. Alternatively, the LP firm provides benefits to 
the firm not captured by pure spread reduction.
16 
The fact that on average firms experience a larger reduction in total transaction costs 
than it costs to arrange the contract suggests that they view the adoption of an LP as a positive 
NPV project that will reduce their cost of capital. Evidence consistent with this conjecture was 
presented in Table 5 which shows positive CARs following the start of market making services.  
As mentioned earlier, the observed dispersion of cost of contracts may be a result of variation in 
firm characteristics, negotiating power, or may reflect the fact that listed firms pay more to obtain 
more benefits. To test this hypothesis, we regress contract costs against variables which are 
indicative of increased benefits provided by LP firms and firm characteristics.  
First we might expect that the larger the spread reduction expected from the LP firm, the 
more they will charge to provide it. Toward that end, we include two independent variables. The 
first variable, Contract Spread Improvement (∆%Sprd), is defined as the difference between the 
average observed percentage spread prior to the LP adoption date and the maximum spread 
width agreed to by the LP firm. While the first variable measures the location of the average 
spread relative to the contractual maximum spread, the second variable measures the 
dispersion of the spreads in the pre period. That variable is Percentage Spreads Wider 
(%Wider) and it is defined as the percentage of the pre period percentage spread observations 
that are wider than the contractual maximum spread.  Since higher contractual minimums for 
depth require a larger capital commitment on the part of LP firms, we would expect there to be a 
positive relationship between these this variable and contract cost. The variable Depthi is the 
contract specified minimum depth 
In terms of firm characteristics, we would expect price and volatility to be directly related 
to the capital commitment of LP firms and thus also directly related to the negotiated contract 
                                            
16 Recall that a number of firms listed in Table 1 have maximum contract spread widths about equal to or 
greater than the average spread width in the pre period. Paying for Market Quality 
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fee. We therefore examine σi , defined as firm i’s intraday standard deviation of quote midpoints 
in the pre-LP period and Pricei  which is the average closing quote midpoint for firm i in the pre-
LP period, 
LP firms may give discounts to firms that they do other business with, for example 
investment banking clients. We proxy for other business relationships by including a dummy 
variable, Alreadyi, which is assigned the value 1 if the LP firm trades the listed firm before they 
begin market making services (nine do). Finally, it is established in the IPO literature that 
investment banking firms view trading profits in the aftermarket as part of their compensation. It 
may very well be the case for contracts of the type studied here as well. LP firms that expect 
trading profits in the post period may charge less for the contract. We proxy for expected profits 
by using Incremental Profits, IncProfi defined as the incremental profit in the post period. For 
firms already trading the stock in the pre period, incremental profit is defined as post period 
trading profit less the pre period trading profit. For firms that did not trade the stock in the post 
period, it is simply the post period trading profit. We then perform the following regression: 
IncProfit Already Depth Wider Sprd Price C i i i i i i 7 6 5 β β σ + + + + ∆ + + + = β % β % β β β β 4 3 2 1 0  
where Ci  is either the fixed or total monthly contract cost for firm i. 
The parameter estimates are listed in Table 7. In general we find support for all there 
areas of potential relationship with contract cost. The model results reveal a positive relationship 
between the percentage of time in the pre period that spreads exceed the contractual spread 
width. Curiously, the relationship between the anticipated spread improvement and costs is 
negative. However, neither variable is statistically significant in the model examining fixed costs, 
while both are marginally significant for the total costs model.  We do find a significant positive 
relationship between minimum depth and both fixed and total costs.  
Volatility and price are both positively related to both types of costs but only price is  
significant at acceptable levels. We also find support for the notion that LP firms give discounts 
to listed firms that they have established relationships with. Finally, we find no statistically Paying for Market Quality 
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significant relationship between our proxy for expected profits and either cost measures. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Until recently, firms took a somewhat passive role in the market quality of their stocks. 
Now firms are becoming more proactive. Firms listing on the NYSE interview several specialist 
firms before choosing the one to make a market in their stock. However, the firms do not have 
direct control over the quality of the market made for their stock. NYSE firms pay a listing fee 
that bundles together implicit market making fees (if any). In some markets (e.g., Euronext and 
the Nordic Exchanges), firms may directly contract with a firm to provide market making 
services for its stock. The firm may specify certain market quality parameters such as maximum 
spread width.  
Given that a number of papers have shown that prices are directly related to liquidity, the 
decision to contract with a liquidity provider is a capital budgeting decision. The question then 
becomes, is contracting for market making services a positive net present value project? In this 
paper we investigate these issues and the evidence suggests that the answer to the question is 
yes.  
In particular we examine 50 previously illiquid firms that contracted to have market 
making services provided on the Stockholm stock Exchange. The market makers are called 
liquidity providers and firms can set maximum spread widths for their stocks, which may be 
smaller than an exchange imposed maximum for stocks employing liquidity providers.  
We find that spreads narrow by a statistically significant amount following the beginning 
of market making services. Additional tests suggest that the decrease in spreads is not due to 
confounding factors. We also find that depth increases, both at the inside and in aggregate for 
four price levels away from the inside. Accompanying the increase in depth, we find a significant 
increase in average trade size, suggesting that traders no longer find it necessary to break up 
their orders to accommodate low market depth.  Paying for Market Quality 
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Also accompanying the increase in depth, we find evidence of a statistically significant 
decrease in return volatility. The decrease is found following the start of market making activities 
for both intra-day and inter-day return volatility. This suggests that liquidity providers prevent 
orders from walking the book, in a manner very similar to that found for NYSE specialists. We 
also find that trading activity increases following the contracting, suggesting that liquidity 
providers are actively engaged in trading with public customers.  
We investigate this hypothesis, by examining the trading frequency and trade size of 
liquidity providers before and after the start of market making activities. We find that for seven 
firms the contracted liquidity provider is not involved in trades in a firm’s stock prior to the 
contract. For these firms liquidity providers are involved in a statistically significant 15 trades per 
day and add 9,203 shares to the total volume. For firms that do have liquidity provider firms 
trading in their stocks before contracting with them, we also find a statistically significant 
increase in the number of trades.  
Given the large body of literature that finds a relationship between liquidity and stock 
prices, we examine abnormal returns and CARs over the period following the beginning of 
market maker services. We find evidence in support of this stream of literature. In particular we 
find that the average CAR for 10 days after the contract start date is a statistically significant 
6.19%.  We find evidence that the CARs are inversely related to spread improvement, 
suggesting that the CARs are not a result of a market wide trend. 
We examine LP firm trading profits and find no evidence that they obtain compensation 
other than the contract fees.  Finally, we examine the relationship between contract costs to the 
contractual improvement in market quality, firm specific characteristics (such as volatility and 
price), and existing relationships with LP firms. Results of a regression analysis suggest that all 
three groups of factors are priced in the contracts. 
Taken together our findings suggest that firms may benefit from taking a proactive role in 
the market making of their securities and that this decision is no different than other projects a Paying for Market Quality 
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firm  faces. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table contains the names of 50 Stockholm Stock Exchange listed firms that contract with liquidity 
providers to make markets in their firm’s stock along with the date the contract becomes effective. 
Also reported are the average percentage spread in for the 20 trading days prior to the start date and 
the contractual maximum spread. 
Company Name  Liquidity Provider  Start Date  Avg.  
 % Spread 
Contract Max 
% Spread 
A-Com AB  Kaupthing Bank  22-Oct-03 7.51%  4.00%
Addtech AB  REMIUM  30-Jun-03 3.31%  2.00%
Ångpanneföreningen, AB  Öhman  31-Oct-03 1.89%  4.00%
Beijer AB, G & L  Öhman  11-Jun-03 2.51%  4.00%
Beijer Alma AB, ser B  REMIUM  17-Nov-03 3.72%  2.50%
Beijer Electronics AB  Öhman  13-May-03 1.37%  2.00%
Berg & Co, AB, C F  Svenska Handelsbanken  12-May-03 6.53%  4.00%
Borås Wäfveri AB, ser B  REMIUM 15-Dec-03 5.65%  3.00%
BTS Group AB  REMIUM  8-May-03 3.86%  4.00%
Capona AB  Carnegie  17-Jun-03 1.53%  2.00%
Cherryföretagen AB  REMIUM  1-Oct-03 7.47%  4.00%
Consilium AB  Öhman  24-Sep-03 5.56%  2.00%
Daydream Software AB  REMIUM  2-Jan-04 2.98%  2.50%
Diamyd Medical AB  REMIUM  22-May-03 11.42%  3.00%
Digital Vision AB  Kaupthing Bank  9-Mar-04 3.77%  4.00%
Frango AB  Svenska Handelsbanken  11-Jun-03 5.79%  4.00%
HQ Fonder AB  H & Q Fondkommission AB  21-Jul-03 3.50%  2.00%
ITAB Industri AB  REMIUM  22-May-03 7.41%  2.50%
Klövern AB  H & Q Fondkommission AB  2-May-03 3.11%  4.00%
Ledstiernan AB  H & Q Fondkommission AB  2-Dec-02 5.46%  4.00%
LjungbergGruppen AB ser. B  Carnegie  2-Jan-04 2.11%  3.00%
Modul 1 Data AB  REMIUM  17-Nov-03 1.81%  3.00%
MSC Konsult AB  REMIUM  9-May-03 16.05%  4.00%
MultiQ International AB  Öhman  1-Nov-03 4.36%  2.00%
Nefab AB  REMIUM  8-May-03 1.97%  2.50%
Novestra, AB  REMIUM  8-May-03 1.96%  2.50%
Onetwocom AB    Öhman  1-Nov-03 3.05%  4.00%
Opcon AB  Carnegie  8-Sep-03 7.75%  4.00%
OptiMail AB  REMIUM  8-May-03 2.98%  3.00%
Öresund, Investment AB  H & Q Fondkommission AB  28-Jul-03 0.96%  2.00%
PartnerTech AB  Carnegie  1-Nov-03 1.63%  4.00%
Poolia AB  Enskilda  19-May-03 10.62%  2.50%






Company Name  Liquidity Provider  Start Date  Avg.  
 % Spread 
Contract Max 
% Spread 
ProAct IT Group AB  REMIUM  25-Feb-03 3.90%  2.00%
Proffice AB  Carnegie  12-Jun-03 5.99%  4.00%
ProfilGruppen AB  REMIUM  15-Oct-03 3.19%  2.50%
RaySearch Laboratories AB  Öhman 8-Jan-04 2.51%  2.00%
Sapa AB  Svenska Handelsbanken  1-Jul-03 2.04%  2.00%
Sintercast AB  E. Penser Fondkommission  2-Jan-04 3.11%  4.00%
Strålfors AB, ser B  Danske Markets 26-Nov-03 1.98%  2.00%
SWECO AB, ser. B  H & Q Fondkommission AB  2-Feb-04 1.80%  3.00%
Teligent AB  Carnegie  17-Jun-03 6.02%  4.00%
Transcom WorldWide S.A.   REMIUM  15-Sep-03 1.91%  2.00%
Tricorona Mineral AB, ser B  REMIUM 15-Dec-03 6.97% 3.00%
TV4 AB  Carnegie  10-Nov-03 3.76%  2.50%
VBG AB  REMIUM  1-Oct-03 12.49%  3.00%
VLT AB  Svenska Handelsbanken  12-May-03 2.72%  2.80%
Vostok Nafta Investment Ltd  H & Q Fondkommission AB  13-May-03 1.66%  4.00%
Wedins Skor & Access. AB  Öhman  1-Sep-03 2.32%  4.00%







Table 2  
Market Quality Measures  
This table contains changes in various market quality measures for the common stocks of a sample of 
50 Stockholm Stock Exchange listed firms that contract with liquidity providers to make markets in 
their firm’s stock. The pre (post) sample period is the 20 trading days before (after) the start date. The 
start date is not included in either sample. Spread and depth measures are the average of limit order 
book data observed every fifteen minutes throughout the day. Quoted spreads are defined as the best 
ask minus the best bid observed at 15 minute intervals. Percentage quoted spread is measured 
relative to the midpoint of the best bid. We also include two measures of the dispersion of quoted 
percentage spread. They are the percentage of time that quoted percentage spread is either wider or 
narrower than the contractual maximum spread. The depth measures are sampled only at times 
where a two-sided market exists. Reported is the depth at the inside as well as for the four price levels 
away from the inside. For intra-day volatility only 15 minute intervals for which a mid-quote exists at 
both ends are included. The daily number of trades, trading volume, and trade size are self-
explanatory. We also measure the percentage of time that there is a two-sided (both a bid and ask) 
quote. The percentage of time is based on the number of 15 minute intervals with a two-sided quote, 
divided by the total number of 15 minute intervals in the sample period (pre or post). Data are 
averaged by firm and then across firms. For each measure, we list the pre and post firm averages as 
well as the absolute and relative change. Tests of significance of the difference between pre- and 
post-spread values using a paired t-test are in italics. 
(Table on next page)  
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Table 2  
(continued)  
Measure  Pre  Post  Absolute 
Change  t-Statistic  Relative 
Change  t-Statistic 
Quoted spread (%)   4.47%  2.06%  -2.41  -6.18
***    
Quoted spread (SEK)   1.67  0.78  -0.89  -3.63
***    
Percentage of quotes 
wider than contract 
maximum 
49.3% 8.1%  -41.2% -9.68
*** 
  
Percentage of quotes 
narrower than contract 
maximum 
50.3% 91.3%  40.9%  9.80
*** 
  
Depth at the best price 
(shares)   13,545 20,396  6,851  1.46 36.7%  4.54
*** 
Depth away from the 
inside (shares)   57,736 80,306  22,569  1.42 23.51%  3.28
*** 
Intra-day Return volatility 
(%)  7.88 5.76  -2.13  -3.91
***    
Daily Number of Trades   9.18  14.82  5.64  3.02
***  
 
Daily Trading Volume 
(shares)   48,153 135,894  85,869  2.56
** 301.3% 3.24
*** 
Daily Trading Volume 
(SEK)   314,575 1,220,607  906,032  1.76
*  375.2% 3.10
*** 
Trade Size (in shares)   3,072  4,884  1,812  2.39
**   
 
Percentage of time with 
two sided quote  99.6% 99.8%  0.17%  1.05    
 
*** Denotes significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significant at the 0.05 level 
    * Denotes significant at the 0.10 level  
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Table 3  
Control Regressions for Execution Costs  
This table reports the results of regressions of the form:  
t i, 4 t i, 3 t i, 2 t i, 1 0 t i, Dummy β σ β Volume β Price β β S + + + + =   
where:  t i, S  the mean quoted spread (currency or percentage) for firm i in period t (pre or post); 
t i, Price   the mean closing price for firm i during period t;  t i, Volume  the mean daily share volume for 
firm i during period t;  t i, σ  is the standard deviation of intra-day return for firm i during period t (based 
on mid-quotes); Dummyi,t is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the period is post, otherwise 
zero.  
 




(SEK)   2.62 2.94
*** 0.01  4.34
***  -0.19 -
2.29






    
   
Quoted Spread %   0.06 5.71
***   -0.004      
-3.48
**  0.30 6.03






*** Denotes significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significant at the 0.05 level 
    * Denotes significant at the 0.10 level  
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Table 4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and the Relationship to Spread Improvement 
 
This table reports abnormal returns for a sample of 50 Stockholm Stock Exchange listed firms that 
contract with liquidity providers to make markets in their firm’s stock.  Abnormal returns are defined as 
those in excess of returns predicted by the market model each period. Market model parameters are 
estimated using daily return and index values over the period t-125 to t-6 where t is the date the 
liquidity provider begins providing services. Abnormal returns are then calculated each day for each 
firm for the period t-5 to t+10. Scholes-Williams betas are estimated  to correct for infrequent trading 
and the daily return on the OMX benchmark index is used as the market return. Listed below are each 
period’s abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) with respective t statistics in italics. 
To compare the relationship between the CAR and spread improvement, perform the following 

















1 0 β β . 
Where the last term is the relative change in percentage quoted spread. Listed in the last four columns 
below are the parameter estimates and their t statistics. Levels of significance are indicated for a one-
sided test. 
Table on next page  
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Table 4 





















-5 0.41  1.02  0.41  1.02 0.30  0.35  -0.25 -0.14 
-4 0.25  0.42  0.66  1.00 1.48  1.04  1.94  0.66 
-3 -0.65 -1.13  0.01  0.01 -0.93  -0.56  -2.23 -0.64 
-2 0.26  0.47  0.27  0.32 -1.24 -0.68  -3.56 -0.94 
-1 -0.30 -0.62  -0.03  -0.03 -1.71  -0.83  -3.98 -0.92 
0 1.08 1.57*  1.05  0.87 -2.32 -0.90 -7.98  -1.49* 
1  0.81  1.36* 1.86 1.39*  -2.92  -1.04  -11.29  -1.94** 
2 -0.23 -0.61  1.63  1.25 -3.06 -1.12 -11.08  -1.95** 
3 0.06 0.19  1.69  1.29*  -2.00 -0.72 -8.71  -1.51* 
4 1.06 1.26  2.75  1.79**  1.03  0.31  -4.06  -0.59 
5 0.03 0.05  2.78  1.71**  1.34  0.38  -3.41  -0.46 
6 0.54 1.16  3.32  1.98**  -0.12 -0.03 -8.13  -1.09 
7 0.78 1.36*  4.09  2.24**  -0.38 -0.10  -10.58  -1.30* 
8 1.36 1.40*  5.46  2.29**  -1.67 -0.33  -16.84  -1.61* 
9 0.57 1.41*  6.02  2.34***  -1.73 -0.32  -18.33  -1.62* 
10 0.16  0.22  6.19  2.11**  -2.73  -0.44 -21.07  -1.64* 
 
*** Denotes significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significant at the 0.05 level 





Liquidity Provider Contribution  
This table examines those trades involving the liquidity provider for the common stocks of a sample of 
50 Stockholm Stock Exchange listed firms that contract with liquidity providers to make markets in 
their firm’s stock.  The measures considered are the daily number of trades, daily trading volume (in 
shares and Swedish kroner (SEK)), and trade size. Also reported are two versions of LP firm total 
trading profits (TP): 




i i in in it it i I p I p x p TP
1
0 0 , 
where, for stock i and transaction t, xit is the LP firm signed volume for trade t, pit is the price, Iit is the 





it in x I
1
.  The first measure only includes 
the summation on the right hand side of the equation while the second includes the change in 
inventory. Only those trades involving the LP firm are included. The Pre column lists the average for 
the 20 trading days prior to the introduction of an LP, while the post column lists the average for the 20 
trading days after the introduction. Also listed are the absolute and relative changes from the pre to 
the post period. The date LP firms began providing services is not included in either period. Panel A 
reports only post results for the 14 firms that had no liquidity provider activity before contracting, while 
Panel B includes the 36 firms that had trading activity before contracting with a liquidity provider. In 
Panel A, tests of significance are the difference from zero. In Panel B, tests of significance are of the 
difference between pre- and post-values using a paired t-test (both in italics.). 














Change  t-Statistic  Relative 
Change  t-Statistic 
A. Firms with no prior activity by the liquidity provider (14 firms) 
Daily Number of 
Trades   -  15.42  -  15.04***    
Daily Trading 
Volume (shares)   -  9,203  -  2.58
**    
Daily Trading 
Volume (SEK)   -  97,409  -  6.82
***    
Trade Size (shares)   -  1,612  -  2.86
**    
Trading profit not 
including inventory   108,682   0.84    
Trading profit 
including inventory   2,651  -1.56    
B. Firms with prior activity by the liquidity provider (36 firms) 
Daily Number of 
Trades   7.61  13.9  6.31  6.34***   
 
Daily Trading 
Volume (shares)   24,225  31,966  7,741  0.69  6.03  2.21
** 
Daily Trading 
Volume (SEK)   292,846  309,428  16,582  0.10  6.31  6.34
*** 
Trade Size (shares)   5,947  4,183  -1,764  -0.83   
 
Trading profit not 
including inventory  830,198 2,879,062  2,048,864  1.65     
Trading profit not 
including inventory  12,319 -35,064 -47,383  -0.80     
 
*** Denotes significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significant at the 0.05 level 
    * Denotes significant at the 0.10 level  
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 Table 6 
Comparison of Contract Terms 
In this table we compare contract terms and stockholder execution cost savings for a sample of 50 
Stockholm Stock Exchange listed firms that contract with liquidity providers to make markets in their 
firm’s stock. Contract cost terms are available for 23 of our sample firms, representing three different 
liquidity providers. Panel A lists the frequency counts for the contractual maximum spread width and 
minimum depth. 
17 Three firms do not specify minimum depth amounts in their contracts, while 20 
specify the minimum spread width in round lots. Ten also specify the minimum depth in shares. Panel 
B reports the mean, median, minimum, and maximum for the monthly costs specified in the contracts. 
All have a fixed monthly cost component. Nineteen firms also have a variable cost component which 
specifies that listed firms will pay the LP firm a fee per trade that the LP is involved in as principal. All 
19 place a cap on the maximum variable cost of the contract. Total costs sum the fixed and variable 
components. Panel C compares the total maximum cost of the contracts to the monthly benefits 
defined as execution cost savings. The first row of Panel C lists the daily average execution cost 
savings after the firm adopted a LP in Swedish krone. Also listed is the difference between monthly 
benefits (based on a 20 day month) and the total monthly maximum contract cost, expressed in both 
Swedish krone and US dollars. The final row contains the relative benefit level to the monthly cost. 
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A. Contract Terms 
 
Term N  Values 
Frequency 
Maximum 





















B. Contract Costs 
 
Cost N  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Fixed Monthly 
Cost  23 16,000  12,000 10,000 50,000 
Maximum 




23 23,348  20,000 15,000 50,000 
 
C. Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 












23  29,232.12      7,663.84 -27,34.56  300,927.39 
Monthly 




Relationship between Contract Terms and Firm Characteristics 
This table reports the results of regressions of contract costs against various firm characteristics for 23 
firms that contracted with a liquidity provider and for which contract terms are available. In particular 
we perform the following regression: 
IncProfit Already Depth Wider Sprd Price C i i i i i i 7 6 5 β β σ + + + + ∆ + + + = β % β % β β β β 4 3 2 1 0  
where Ci is the monthly cost (either fixed or total) for firm i; σi is firm i’s intraday standard deviation of 
quote midpoints in the pre-LP period; Pricei is the average closing quote midpoint for firm i in the pre-
LP period,  ∆%Sprdi is the observed average percentage spread for firm i in the 20 trading days 
before employing an LP less the maximum percentage spread width listed in the contract; %Wideri is 
the percentage of observations in the pre period that percentage spread is wider than the contracted 
maximum spread width,  Depthi is the contract specified minimum depth. Alreadyi is a dummy variable 
assigned the value 1 if the LP firm traded the stock in the pre-period, otherwise zero Finally, IncProfi is 
a proxy for expected LP trading profit defined as the incremental profit in the post period. For firms 
already trading the stock in the pre period, incremental profit is defined as post period trading profit 
less the pre period trading profit. For firms that did not trade the stock in the post period, it is simply 
the post period trading profit.  
t-statistics are in italics and significance levels are indicated with asterisks. 






  Fixed Costs    Total Costs 
Intercept  2,939 

























1.27    12,535 
1.91
* 
Contract Minimum Depth  754 
6.16
***    602 
5.06
*** 
Already Trade Firm  -6,919 
-2.49













(0.82)    10.59 
{0.75} 
 
*** Denotes significant at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significant at the 0.05 level 
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